Haiti: Politics and Tragedy

The Newsprint

How does one go about politicking in a time of tragedy? No doubt there are those who would prefer that we all work earnestly together for the sake of the common good. And on the ground, in emergencies, that frequently happens, at least in localized instances. But when we don’t agree on the ends, agreeing on the means can be especially tricky.

Little brings this more clearly into frame than the disaster in Haiti. The human cost is numbing. The bravery and endurance of aid workers, soldiers, and everyday Haitians has been admirable and remarkable. Individuals and groups from around the world have chipped in a great deal of money that can do tremendous good for this destitute nation in the coming months and years.

Yet at some point the TV cameras will switch off, the reporters will depart, and the world’s attention will drift. Once that happens, and sooner than it ought, very difficult steps will remain to be taken in the rebuilding of Haiti. Yet the “who” and “how” of rebuilding must be decided now if it is to transpire at all. Enter the politics.

There are two prospects for Haiti: a return to the status quo ante (or something slightly worse) or a dramatic political-economic overhaul laying the groundwork for real development. Sadly, the former is overwhelmingly more likely than the latter. We may trot out all the platitudes we like about phoenixes rising from ashes, but we would do well to remember that the phoenix is a mythical bird.

Nonetheless, the second vision is possible, or at least probably possible. But it will require the nations of the world, and especially of the Western Hemisphere, to undertake a dangerous and potentially impossible mission. They must commit themselves to be the de facto government of Haiti for at least the next eighteen months if not longer.

If one thinks that the clear and present need of the Haitian people is enough to calm anxieties about neocolonialism in Latin America, think again. On Monday Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez accused the United States of coordinating an opportunistic occupation of Haiti, emphasizing the deployment of combat troops to restore order.

Though Chavez’s remarks – that the US should supply only humanitarian material aid and perhaps some aid workers – are either opportunistic or inane, they nonetheless reflect in stark terms the broad discomfort that many in Latin America will feel at scenes of American soldiers imposing order in Haitian streets.

And order will have to be imposed. The Haitian regime today declared a state of emergency as social conditions worsened in Port-au-Prince, set to run for the duration of January. Scenes of looting should not shock anyone. Desperately hungry people ought to take what they need to survive in these sorts of situations. But thousands of criminals have escaped from collapsed prisons, and reports on Monday indicated that lynching, shooting, mob rule, and gang violence are spreading.

Given the effective collapse of government in Haiti, what sort of order shall the world powers impose upon it, at least provisionally? The United States is unwilling and maybe unable to occupy Haiti effectively and assign governing responsibility to its military and civilian agencies. Yet without strong leadership and technical coordination from the American military, the situation in Port-au-Prince and perhaps around the country is all but certain to degenerate further. The UN intends to send more forces, but their capacity in theater will pale in comparison to American marines and soldiers.

Even if unilateral American coordination is effective in the short term, our sustained presence will erode its own legitimacy unless we are visibly supported by the UN and the other nations in the hemisphere. This presents a window of opportunity. Chavez is the lone voice decrying American involvement, a reflection more of his own desperation than of international opinion. Raul Castro has been mum on the issue.

But the situation will change. The site of American helicopters dropping soldiers on the front lawn of the crumbled Presidential palace, with the sound of cheering in the background, was stirring stuff. But suspicion of American motives runs deep and we will be seen as meddling in Haiti’s domestic affairs if our involvement is not characterized by clear goals.

Once the Haitian government is nominally restored, it should become the mouthpiece for a multinational hemispheric coordination effort. This disaster is an opportunity to put the Monroe Doctrine on better footing by bringing in regional powers, including Cuba, to coordinate recovery. Brazil, head of the UN stabilization force in Haiti, must be a major player. Bolivia already has forces operating in Haiti under the UN’s remit; they should be encouraged and given a visible role in delivering humanitarian assistance.

Most of all, the United States in collaboration with several Latin and Caribbean powers should seek a new UN Security Council resolution empowering a multinational force to remain in Haiti for the next two years. A new resolution is crucial as it will allow the hemispheric powers to determine what a good Haiti will look like. It will further provide them the flexibility to restore the requisite conditions for Haitians to resume control of their own government. Paper institutions will not do. Substantive development, beginning with a commitment to real security, is going to be the answer.

Importantly, neither development nor security is likely to be provided by the Haitian elite, and so turning power back to them prematurely will all but guarantee a return to the status quo ante. Haiti’s wealthy upper class has proven unwilling to build the sort of institutional architecture necessary to stabilize the country and they have proved incapable of diversifying its consumption and import driven economy.

Instead of turning power over development and control of aid resources back to the Haitian elite, a multinational occupying force could husband that power legitimately for long enough to restore meaningful order on the streets and begin a concerted effort to train and outfit the Haitian military and domestic police services. The influence of transnational smuggling cartels might then be ameliorated and the local gangs that prey on small proprietors curtailed.

Haiti is unlikely to be a wealthy country, certainly not in this lifetime. But given the outpouring of international support following this disaster, there is little reason for it to return to desperate poverty without a fight. Recriminations about past American involvement in colonial projects will do nothing for the Haitian people, but they may oblige American forces to limit their effectiveness and depart prematurely. The clock is already ticking.

Thus, the goals for the United States in Haiti today are three: provide security, develop a multinational hemispheric coordination body to replace the Haitian government for eighteen months, and maintain control over development aid so that it goes toward building institutions and not simply lining the pockets of Haiti’s extant elite.